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Bar News - January 17, 2003 NH Supreme Court Opinion Summaries JURY INSTRUCTION - MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT DUGGAN, J. The plaintiff appealed following a jury trial verdict in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff argued that the trial court (McHugh, J.) erred in instructing the jury. The defendant cross-appealed arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict. The supreme court agreed with the defendant and affirmed the judgment in his favor. Laurence Hill went to Hampstead Hospital (hospital) for voluntary admission due to relationship problems. He was treated by the defendant, a staff psychiatrist. At the time of admission, Hill admitted to recent suicidal thoughts, a history of alcohol, and depression symptoms. The defendant diagnosed Hill with depression, alcohol abuse, and psycho-social stressors of family discord. The defendant recommended a treatment plan of medication, family meetings, individual and group psychotherapy, education sessions, and a 12-step program. After four days in the hospital, Hill gave the hospital twenty-four hour notice that he wanted to leave. Hill told the defendant that the hospital stay had helped him clear his head, and that he was no longer suicidal. The defendant concluded that Hill did not meet the involuntary admission criteria. The defendant discharged Hill with instructions to take the depression medicine and to go to follow-up treatment with an outpatient mental health provider. After twelve days of living in the community, the defendant committed suicide. On appeal the court considered whether the trial court should have granted the defendant's motions for directed verdict. The defendant argued that even if the treatment he provided was not completely consistent with the standard of care, it would not be reasonably foreseeable that such failure would cause Hill to commit suicide after his discharge from the hospital. In a medical negligence action the plaintiff must prove: (1) The standard of reasonable professional practice in the medical care provider's profession or specialty; (2) That the medical care provider failed to act in accordance with such standard; and (3) That as a proximate result thereof, the injured person suffered injuries which would not otherwise have occurred. After listening to the plaintiff's expert, the court found that the plaintiff did not provide a causal link between the defendant's conduct and Hill's suicide. Further, the plaintiff failed to provide evidence that Hill's suicide would not have otherwise occurred. The court thus agreed that the trial court should have granted the defendant's motion for directed verdict.
DAMAGE AWARD REALLOCATION DUGGAN, J. The plaintiffs appealed from a Superior Court (T. Nadeau, J.) order in favor of the defendant. The supreme court affirmed. The plaintiffs were injured in a car accident when they were passengers in a vehicle driven by Hartford, who was intoxicated at the time of the accident. The plaintiffs sued both Hartford and Colby's, the bar that had served Hartford alcohol before the accident. The parties apportioned liability and damages in a settlement agreement. The settlement agreement awarded plaintiff Rodgers damages of $95,000, and found Hartford 52 2/3% at fault, Colby's 26 1/3% at fault, and Rodgers 21% at fault. Plaintiff Pare was awarded damages of $60,000 and found Hartford 58 1/3% at fault, Colby's 25% at fault, and Pare 16 2/3% at fault. The settlement agreement stipulated that Hartford was judgment proof with his share of the damages uncollectible. The plaintiffs filed motions to reallocate the share of awards, claiming that RSA 507:7-e, III (III) allowed for Hartford's uncollectible share to be reallocated to Colby's. On appeal plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in denying their motion to reallocate the award of damages. They argued that RSA 507:7-e, III permits a plaintiff to seek reallocation of damages among defendants when one defendant is judgment proof, even as to defendants who are less than fifty percent at fault. The court explained that the plain language of the statute dictates that Colby's should be liable only for its portion of the damages. The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the process outlined in the statute is available for use by plaintiffs, and instead found that the section applies only to contribution among defendants. The court stated that the provisions of RSA 507:7-e to -h (1997) were not intended as plaintiffs' remedies because plaintiffs could already recover their entire judgment from any one defendant. The court also found that the plaintiffs' reading of the statute created a contradiction in the statutory purpose. The court followed the legislature's plain language and intent in affirming the judgment.
SENATE REDISTRICTING PER CURIAM. The New Hampshire Supreme Court's jurisdiction was invoked following the legislative failure to override the Governor's veto of its redistricting plan. The court devised and adopted its own plan for redistricting the New Hampshire Senate. Part II, Article 26 of the New Hampshire Constitution requires the legislature to redistrict the senate at the regular session following the federal decennial census. The New Hampshire Legislature prepared a plan that the Governor vetoed. The legislature did not override the veto, then recessed without enacting a valid senate redistricting plan into law. The court was called on to establish a new district plan in order to guarantee the people of New Hampshire an equal right to vote, pursuant to Part I, Article 11 of the New Hampshire Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court first interpreted New Hampshire Constitution's guarantee that each citizen's vote will have equal weight. N.H. Const., pt. I, art. 11. The court interpreted the "as nearly equal as may be in population" language to be at least as protective of the citizens' voting rights as the federal constitutional standard of one person/one vote, and thus based its decision solely on Part II, Article 26. The court determined that the overriding objective of redistricting was substantial equality of population among the legislative districts so that one citizen's vote was approximately equal in weight to another citizen's vote. The court also considered the New Hampshire Constitution's mandates that: (1) senate districts be comprised of "contiguous" towns, city ward and unincorporated places; (2) no town, city ward or unincorporated place may be divided unless the town, city ward or unincorporated place requests division by referendum; and (3) each senate district must elect only one senator. N.H. Const., pt. II, arts. 26, 26-a. The petitioners recommended a "least change" approach, but the court found the plan flawed because it did not rest entirely on the federal census data, as required by law. The senate president proposed two alternative plans for the court's consideration: a "compromise plan" and a "deviation plan." The court rejected both plans because the senate president did not rely solely upon federal census data but instead relied on ward population data. The senate president argued the plan's validity, because it was the result of negotiation among Democrats and Republicans. The court also rejected the senate's proposed plan for the same reasons that it rejected the other proposed plans - it did not follow federal census data. The court rejected all of the proposals as starting points, and explained that the court has a constitutional criteria to follow in court-ordered remedial plans. None of the proposals complied with the neutral criteria. Thus, the court concluded that none of the submitted plans was appropriate for adoption by the court. The goal of the court's plan was to remedy constitutional deficiencies in the senate districts. The court's primary guidance was the principle of one person/one vote. Choosing to maintain the core districts, the court allowed for contiguous populations to be added to or subtracted from the district to correct the population deviation. The court's plan created the least change for New Hampshire citizens and allowed for single-member senate districts.
IMPOSITION OF SUSPENDED SENTENCE - NON-CRIMIINAL VIOLATION-LEVEL OFFENSE BROCK, J. In this interlocutory transfer from the Hillsborough District Court (Hatfield, J.) the court considered whether a non-criminal violation-level offense can trigger the imposition of a suspended sentence conditioned on the defendant's "good behavior." The supreme court determined that it could not. The defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a controlled drug and one count of resisting arrest. The defendant's sentence of sixty days imprisonment and $200 fine on each count was first deferred for six months then later was suspended for two years conditioned on the defendant's good behavior. The defendant was then arrested for transporting alcoholic beverages by a minor, a violation-level offense. See RSA 265:81-a (1993). The defendant pleaded guilty, received a $300 fine, and lost his license for sixty days. The court stated that in order for non-criminal conduct to impose a sentence, a defendant must be given actual notice that engaging in non-criminal conduct could trigger this result. Due process requires that a suspended or deferred sentence must specify the types of non-criminal conduct that will cause the sentence to be imposed. Thus, the court found that a suspended or deferred sentence conditioned on "good behavior" may not be imposed without a finding that the defendant engaged in criminal conduct. Because the defendant committed a violation-level offense and no crime, the court stated that the trial court could not impose the defendant's sentences.
AGGRAVATED FELONIOUS SEXUAL ASSAULT DUGGAN, J. The defendant was convicted of aggravated felonious sexual assault. See RSA 632-A:2, II (1996) (amended 1999). The supreme court affirmed. The defendant lived and worked for C.B.'s uncle and lived at C.B.'s aunt and uncle's house. During this time C.B. testified that the defendant touched her twice "between her legs." C.B. reported this to her mother. The defendant told the police that he did not remember being alone with C.B. and that he never touched her. In a later conversation, the defendant explained the incident to C.B.'s aunt and that he might have touched C.B. under her pants. The aunt recounted this statement to the police a year after the conversation. The defendant first contended that C.B.'s testimony regarding him touching her "between her legs" and that he touched her "private parts" and "private area" was insufficient to established that the defendant touched C.B.'s genitalia, as charged. The court held that the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant touched C.B. on her genitalia as charged. The defendant next asked the court to preclude the State and its witnesses from referring to "any and all reasons why C.B.'s aunt is upset with the accused while permitting inquiry by the accused that C.B.'s aunt is in fact upset with the accused." On appeal the defendant argued that the trial court's ruling effectively limited his constitutional right to confront an adverse witness regarding her potential bias, because that would expose other sexual abuse acts to the jury. The court explained that the defendant was not precluded from inquiring into the witness's bias, but that the defendant was informed that any such inquiry would open the door to a limited inquiry by the State to allow C.B.'s aunt to explain her bias. The defendant wanted to introduce the aunt's bad feelings, but did not want to allow the State to reveal the source of the bad feelings, i.e. that she was aware that the defendant had committed other uncharged sex offenses. He was not forced to surrender a constitutional right, but was prevented from selectively introducing evidence to create a misleading advantage. As to whether the trial court erred by denying the defendant's request for a jury instruction on accident, the court concluded that the request was not made in a timely manner, and therefore the trial court did not err in denying the requested instruction. Finally, as to whether the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to orally instruct the jury on the definition of reasonable doubt during the closing instructions to the jury, the court found that the jury instructions fairly and adequately covered the issues of law, and held that the trial court did not err by refusing to repeat the definition of reasonable doubt.
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