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Bar News - February 22, 2002 NH Supreme Court Opinion Summaries PRODUCTS LIABILITY - PROOF OF ALTERNATE DESIGN David S. Vautour & a. v. Body Masters Sports Industries, Inc. DUGGAN, J. The plaintiffs appeal the trial court's order granting a motion for directed verdict. The supreme court reversed and remanded. The plaintiff was injured while using a leg press machine manufactured by the defendant. Despite warning labels, the plaintiff failed to use the upper safety stop while using the machine to perform calf exercises. At trial, the plaintiff's expert testified that the machine was hazardous because it did not have adjustable safety stops. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for directed verdict, however, because the plaintiff's expert failed to offer testimony regarding how an alternate design would prevent the injuries suffered by the plaintiff. The supreme court held that the risk-utility approach is to be applied when determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous. The supreme court held that the risk-utility approach does not require a plaintiff to offer evidence of a reasonable alternative design. It further held that the approach as currently used, protects the interests of both consumers and manufacturers and therefore, declined to adopt section 2(b) of the Restatement, which would impose this additional alternate design requirement.
BREACH OF CONTRACT - LACK OF JURISDICTION - FORUM SELECTION CLAUSE Strafford Technology, Inc. v. Camcar Division of Textron, Inc. BRODERICK, J. The defendant appeals the trial court's order denying its motion to dismiss the plaintiff's suit for breach of contract. The defendant argues that since the parties agreed to settle all disputes in Illinois, New Hampshire lacked jurisdiction. The supreme court reversed and remanded. The parties entered into a contract and when the defendant failed to pay according to the terms of the contract, the plaintiff sued. The contract contained a forum selection clause providing that all disputes "shall be determined by the courts of [Illinois]". The supreme court held that the language in the contract mandated that dispositive action be reached in a particular venue, Illinois. The supreme court reversed the trial court's ruling that the parties' forum selection clause did not confer exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of Illinois and remanded the case for the trial court to consider the plaintiff's equitable arguments that it would be inequitable to enforce the clause.
PERSONNEL APPEALS BOARD Appeal of Mark Armaganian & a. BROCK, C.J. Petitioners appeal the decision of the personnel appeals board (PAB) arguing that they did not conspire to obtain an authorized witness fee and that the PAB's decision to uphold the sanction of major discipline should be reversed. The supreme court reversed. Petitioner, Korontjis, appeared in the Hampton District Court to settle a case on behalf of Petitioner, Armaganian. The case settled and Armaganian did not need to appear to testify. Korontjis, however, signed a certification indicating that Armaganian was entitled to a witness fee and Armaganian later requested payment of the witness fee. Following an internal investigation, the petitioners were suspended for eleven days. On appeal, the PAB upheld the suspension. When their request for a rehearing was denied, the petitioners appealed to the supreme court. The supreme court found that there was uncontroverted testimony that under the "portal to portal" rule, an off-duty trooper who appears in court must be paid a contractual premium even if the case is resolved before the trooper reaches the court. Because the PAB did not find that Armaganian did not travel to the court, the supreme court held that its decision was unjust and unreasonable. The supreme court declined to remand the case to the PAB, given the PAB's delay in filing the record. The supreme court held that the length of the delay substantially prejudiced the petitioners and precluded the possibility of a rehearing. DUGGAN, J. filed a dissent, with whom Justice Nadeau joined. Justice Duggan argued that the decision of the majority was erroneous as the PAB did conclude that Armaganian did not drive to the court and that therefore, there was competent evidence in the record to support the PAB's factual findings.
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