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Bar News - September 20, 2002 NH Supreme Court Opinion Summaries CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ADEQUATE PUBLIC EDUCATION - ACCOUNTABILITY DUGGAN, J. In two prior related cases, the supreme court held that the State must provide and fund a constitutionally adequate public education. See Claremont School Dist. V. Governor, 138 N.H. 183 (1993) (Claremont I) and see Claremont School Dist. V. Governor, 142 N.H. 462 (1997) (Claremont II). In almost nine years since Claremont I, the court has issued eight subsequent opinions directly related to the initial decision. In this case, the supreme court specifically considered: (1) whether the State's obligation to provide a constitutionally adequate public education under part II, article 83 of the New Hampshire Constitution requires the State to include standards of accountability in New Hampshire statutes, regulations and/or rules; and, if so, (2) whether existing statutes, regulations and/or rules satisfy this obligation. Each time, the court sustained the holdings and constitutional underpinnings of Claremont I and Claremont II. In Claremont I, the supreme court concluded that the state was required to provide a constitutionally adequate education to every educable child and to guarantee adequate funding. The court left the constitutional parameters to the legislature and the Governor. In Claremont II, the supreme court held that the property tax assessed to fulfill the State's obligation to provide a constitutionally adequate public education was a State tax, not a local one. Consequently, the education financing system was found to be disproportionate, unreasonable, and in violation of New Hampshire's constitution. The supreme court stated that accountability includes a definition of a constitutionally adequate education, the definition must have standards, and the standards must be subject to meaningful application in order to determine whether the State has fulfilled its duty in providing a constitutionally adequate education. The court concluded, therefore, that the State's duty to provide a constitutionally adequate education includes accountability. In determining whether the existing statutes, regulations and rules meet this obligation, the court agreed with the State's argument that the Legislature could fashion an acceptable system in multiple ways. The court held that because the Minimum Standards for school approval excuse compliance solely based in financial conditions, it is in conflict with the State's duty to provide a constitutionally adequate education. Regarding the New Hampshire Education Improvement and Assessment Program (NHEIAP, RSA chapter 193-C), the court recognized the legislature's interest in improvement and accountability in education, but noted that the State lacks a sufficient mechanism to require that the school districts meet the goals established. The court held, therefore, that because of deficiencies in the system, the State has not met its constitutional obligation to develop a system to ensure the delivery of a constitutionally adequate education. The court concluded that the State has further work to do to provide a constitutionally adequate education and to incorporate meaningful accountability in the education system. NADEAU, J., and DALIANIS, J. dissented, stating that existing statutes, regulations and rules provide for sufficient accountability to withstand a facial constitutional challenge. PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT - ESCROW FUNDS DUGGAN, J. A Judicial Referee found that the respondent violated Rules 1.15(a)(1), 1.15(c), and 8.4(a); and recommended a six month suspension of the respondent's license. The supreme court agreed with the referee and imposed the recommended sanction. The respondent mismanaged an escrow account established for a client by using the funds to pay the client's outstanding legal fees. In addition, the respondent misled the client to believe the funds were in escrow when, in fact, they were not. Because the funds were a factor in a divorce decree, the superior court held a hearing on the handling of the escrow account. The respondent explained that she was entitled to withdraw all of the escrow funds because she believed they were subject to a set-off, and because a letter from the client authorized the withdrawal of the funds. Attorneys at the hearing informed the judge, however, that the respondent received the letter after withdrawing the funds. The Committee on Professional Conduct found the respondent in violation of Rules 1.15(a)(1), 1.15(c), 8.4(c), and 8.4(a). The supreme court first addressed the respondent's due process claim and held that because the respondent was not precluded from introducing material evidence, she was not denied due process. With regard to the alleged error in the judicial referee's finding of facts, the court concluded that a reasonable person could have found that the respondent's conduct did not violate Rule 8.4(c), since the record sufficiently supported that the respondent's representations were not intentionally designed to mislead the court, and since the respondent may have erroneously believed that the client authorized her to withdraw the funds. The court held that a reasonable person could find that the respondent's handling of the escrow funds violated Rule 1.15(c). The court agreed with the referee that the respondent violated Rule 1.15(a)(1) by withdrawing the escrow funds without her client's permission and by failing to keep the funds segregated until an accounting occurred. Because it was determined that the respondent's actions were erroneous and not intentional, the court rejected the committee's argument that the respondent's conduct warranted at least a two-year suspension of law. The court disagreed with the respondent's argument that no sanction should be imposed and the case should be dismissed, and concluded that the respondent's lack of comprehension of her wrongdoing mandated a sanction. DISORDERLY CONDUCT - CRIMINAL TRESPASS - UNDISCLOSED EVIDENCE NADEAU, J. The defendant appealed his convictions for one count of disorderly conduct, see RSA 6444:2, III(a) (1996), and one count of criminal trespass, see RSA 635:2, II(b)(2) (1996). The supreme court remanded. Following a traffic stop of the defendant's fiancée, the defendant, who was a passenger in the vehicle, questioned and then taunted the Nashua Police Department officer who stopped the vehicle. The officer responded rudely to the defendant, prompting the defendant to go to the police department to file a complaint against the officer. The defendant explained the situation to the station supervisor, and stated that he thought the officer's comment was racially motivated and thus in violation of his civil rights. Upon being asked questions regarding the incident, the defendant became increasingly loud and belligerent, was warned, ordered to leave the station, and then escorted to the outside door of the station. Because of the defendant's behavior and refusal to leave the station, the supervisor placed him under arrest. The supreme court evaluated the defendant's sufficiency of the evidence arguments for disorderly conduct and criminal trespass. First, the court stated that based on the testimony of several witnesses who were unanimous in their testimony, a rational trier of fact, evaluating all of the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the State, could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of disorderly conduct. Next, the court stated that while the defendant was entitled to enter the police department to file a complaint, he was sufficiently warned and instructed to quit the premises prior to being arrested. His refusal to do so was sufficient to convict him of criminal trespass. In reviewing the trial court's decision on the management of discovery and admissibility of evidence for an unsustainable exercise of discretion, the supreme court upheld the trial court's decision that the defendant's request for information from the police department was overbroad and unlikely to lead to relevant information. Further, the court stated that the trial court's denial of the defendant's request for an in camera review of personnel records was neither untenable nor unreasonable. Finally, regarding undisclosed evidence, the court remanded the case to the trial court for an in camera review of the documents. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS - INTENTIONAL INVLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS - INVASION OF PRIVACY - WRONGFUL DISCHARGE - WIRETAPPING - EAVESDROPPING BRODERICK, J. The plaintiff appealed several orders of the superior court dismissing certain claims in her first writ, denying her motion to amend, and denying her motion to compel. The plaintiff and two defendants brought a joint interlocutory appeal from rulings made upon the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's second writ. See Super. Ct. R. 8. In an unusual set of procedural circumstances, the supreme court addressed the merits of the plaintiff's second writ and the trial court's rulings on the defendant's motion to dismiss. The supreme court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. During two years of employment at BayBank's predecessor in interest, the plaintiff received positive evaluations. Subsequently, John and Jane Doe intercepted a telephone call between the plaintiff and her friend, a co-worker. The call, made during non-work hours, involved mostly non-work matters but included some discussion about working at BayBank. The Does reported the conversation to BayBank and to Gordon (a vice president of the bank). The defendants then accused the plaintiff of misconduct, threatened termination, and issued a "Counseling Statement" in her permanent personnel record. The plaintiff's next performance evaluation included a raise, improved ratings, and a warning to limit her conversations regarding the bank personnel and customers. The plaintiff, through an attorney, sent a letter to Gordon alleging that the defendants had violated RSA chapter 570-A (1986) and the plaintiff's right to privacy. Her work environment then became hostile. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's order dismissing the plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress against BayBank and Gordon, stating that there was no exception in RSA 281-A:8, I(b) for an allegation of illegal activity, as the plaintiff argued. The court upheld the trial court's ruling that the plaintiff's allegation of intentional infliction of emotional distress against BayBank was barred by RSA 281-A:8, I(a), but noted that an employee's waiver in exchange for benefits does not bar intentional tort actions against co-employees. RSA 281-A:8, I(b). Regarding the plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Gordon, the court found that the plaintiff sufficiently stated a claim. The court rejected the defendants' argument that wiretapping and eavesdropping statute, RSA 570-A:11(1986), did not protect the conversation at issue, and instead found that the communication alleged fell within the definition of a wire communication. The court found that the plaintiff's second writ established factual allegations that the Does, BayBank, and Gordon, disclosed and used the plaintiff's private telephone consideration within the meaning of RSA chapter 570-A. The court held that the plaintiff's claim was not barred by the Worker's Compensation Law. See RSA 281-A:2, XI. The court found that the plaintiff's writ did not allege that Gordon "intruded," because she did not engage in the alleged eavesdropping. Regarding the plaintiff's argument that she stated a claim for invasion of privacy by public disclosure of private facts, the court found the claim against Gordon to be reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery. The court found the claim against Gordon not barred by the exclusivity provision of the Worker's Compensation Law. Regarding the defendants' arguments challenging the trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss the plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim, the court found the claim against BayBank to be reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery. The court found that the plaintiff alleged facts from which a jury could find that she was terminated for performing an act that public policy would encourage. The court disagreed with BayBank's assertion that the Workers' Compensation Law bars the wrongful discharge claim, See RSA 281-A:8, I(a), but noted however, the amendments to RSA 281-A:8 (2001) and limited its decision to this case. WORKERS' COMPENSATION NADEAU, J. The petitioner appealed a decision of the New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (board) awarding compensation benefits to the respondent. The supreme court reversed. While attending a weekend company outing sponsored by the petitioner, the respondent broke her right fibula. The respondent's injuries occurred during a time in which she could enjoy entertainment activities, do nothing, or leave. After the respondent applied for workers' compensation benefits for her injuries, a labor hearing officer determined that the respondent had failed to meet her burden of proof that the injury arose out of and in the course of her employment pursuant to RSA 281-A:2, XI (1999) (amended 2001). Upon appeal, the board found the respondent was entitled to benefits, given the nature of the meeting, the team building atmosphere, and the reasonable expectation of career enhancement offered by participating in the activities. The supreme court disagreed with the board's determination that the respondent held a reasonable expectation that her career would be enhanced by the recreational activities, and held that the board erred as a matter of law when it granted benefits to the respondent based on this expectation. The court commented that the respondent would fail both prongs of RSA 281-A:2, XI, because 1) she testified before the board that she did not have any expectation that her attendance at the regional meeting would affect her employment with the petitioner, and 2) she failed to demonstrate that the petitioner's instructions or policies created a reasonable expectation that her participation was required.
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