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Bar News - November 22, 2002 NH Supreme Court Opinion Summaries COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS — DISCRIMINATION DALIANIS, J. The petitioner challenged the New Hampshire Commission for Human Rights’ (commission) dismissal of her discrimination complaint against the Londonderry Basketball Club (club) on procedural grounds. See RSA 354-A:16, :17 (Supp. 2001). The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed. As a ten-year-old fifth grader, the petitioner was a member of Seabrook’s co-ed recreational basketball team. She then became one of two girls chosen to play on Seabrook’s all-star team. When the team entered the club boys’ basketball tournament, the club notified Seabrook’s coach that girls could not play in the boys’ tournament, pursuant to its policy of offering "separate but equal" tournaments for boys and girls. The petitioner first filed for temporary injunctive relief through the commission, then filed for injunctive relief and damages in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. The petitioner alleged both State and federal claims, including a claim under the State public accommodations statute. See RSA 354-A:16, :17 (Supp. 2001). The coach withdrew from the tournament, making the petitioner’s claims moot. The court granted the club’s motion for summary judgment on the federal claims and dis missed the supplemental law claims. The petitioner then filed a charge of sex discrimination with the commission. The commissioner dismissed the case because the petitioner’s action was precluded by the previous filing in federal court. See RSA 354-A:25 (1995). The New Hampshire Supreme Court disagreed with the petitioner’s argument that the commissioner erred as a matter of law in determining that she had not followed the appropriate procedure. The court construed the plain and ordinary meaning of the words of the statute and held that by choosing to go to court the petitioner was barred from later seeking recourse from the commission. As to the petitioner’s argument that her complaint should not have been dismissed because she followed the procedure suggested by the commission’s executive director, the court found that the express language of the statute provided a means for appropriate recourse, and the reasons for choosing one action over another were irrelevant. The court found that the petitioner’s estoppel argument failed because her reliance on the commission’s executive director’s representations was unreasonable. The petitioner knew or should have known that filing an action in federal court would foreclose her right to bring her complaint before the commission.
DIVORCE – MARITAL ESTATE DUGGAN, J. The respondent appealed an order (Taube, J.) following a final hearing on the divorce petition filed by the petitioner. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. First, the respondent argued that the trial court erred in applying the same property distribution formula to vested and unvested stock options without first determining what part of the unvested stock options were attributable to his employment during the marriage. The Supreme Court stated that a divorce case property settlement is dictated by RSA 458:16-a. Pursuant to the statute, the trial court must first determine what property belongs to the parties. See Holliday v. Holliday, 139 N.H. 213, 215 (1994). Next, the court must "order an equitable division of property between the parties." RSA 458:16-a,II. Because the stock options granted to the respondent in this case could have been a reward for past services, an incentive for future services, or a combination of both; the court remanded to the trial court to determine the portion of the stock options that were attributable to services rendered by the respondent during the marriage. The court stated that the trial court should "order an equitable division" of only the unvested stock options that the respondent earned prior to dissolution of the marriage, pursuant to RSA 458:16-a,II. Addressing the respondent’s second argument, that the trial court erred in disregarding tax and other financial consequences of exercising stock options when it ordered immediate transfer of the property to the petitioner, the court remanded to the trial court. The court directed the trial court to protect the respondent’s equitable share of the stock options and to ensure that the respondent does not have to expend his own resources to distribute the petitioner’s share to her. As to the respondent’s third argument, that the trial court erred in making insufficient findings to justify the property distribution, the court found that the trial court ruled on each of the 209 findings and rulings requested by counsel. The court deemed the respondent’s argument without merit and declined to address it further. The respondent’s fourth argument was that the trial court erred in failing to allocate a margin account. The court found no error in the trial court’s ruling because the language clearly intended to divide the assets held in the margin account equally, while allocating all of the debt in the account to the respondent. Finally, the respondent argued the trial court erred in awarding a fixed amount of child support to the petitioner to continue until the youngest child reaches eighteen. The court found no error and found the child support order to be consistent with RSA 458:35-c (1992). Dalianis, J., dissenting. The dissent believed that the inclusion of the unvested stock options in the marital estate was correct as a matter of law, pursuant to RSA 458:16-a, I (Supp. 2001).
BREACH OF CONTRACT DALIANIS, J. The plaintiffs, thirty-nine police officer employed by the defendant, appealed from an order of the Superior Court (Lynn, J.) granting summary judgment to the defendant on the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims. The Supreme Court affirmed. The plaintiffs were each hired by the defendant pursuant to an individual "Three-Year Training Agreement." Each agreement explained that the defendant would pay a plaintiff’s wage both during and subsequent to training, based on the City of Manchester’s Compensation Plan, and identical to the pay scale in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the defendant and the police union. When the plaintiffs brought the action, they were bargaining unit members. For approximately three years, the defendant and the police union functioned without a CBA. During this time, the defendant did not pay step increases to any bargaining unit employee, including the plaintiffs. Under a new CBA, that plaintiffs received the pay increases to which they were entitled, but the CBA stipulated that it was not retroactive to the time during which the police functioned without a CBA. The court first found error in the plaintiffs’ argument that the superior court’s ruling contravened the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s decision in Collins v. City of Manchester, 143 N.H. 708, 709 (1999) (Collins, I.). The court stated that the plaintiffs misinterpreted Collins I, and that its ruling was that the trial court had jurisdiction to decide this issue in the first instance. As to the plaintiffs’ argument that the superior court erroneously ruled that their individual training agreements were unenforceable with respect to step increases during the time they were employed without a CBA, the court disagreed. Using the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. for guidance, the court held that the training agreements conflicted with the new CBA and were, therefore, unenforceable with respect to wages once the new CBA became effective. The court further held that the training agreements did not entitle the plaintiffs to retroactive step increases during the period of time between the expiration of the previous CBA and the ratification of the new CBA. In addition, the court held that the plaintiffs’ training agreements, with respect to wages, including step increases, were not enforceable after the expiration of the CBA.
CONTRACT – STATUTE OF FRAUDS DUGGAN, J. The defendant, Houston Wire & Cable Company (Houston) appealed a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, PMC Corporation (PMC), and appealed the Superior Court’s (Lynn, J.) denial of the defendant’s judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed. PMC, a supplier of thermocouple wire and cable, and Houston, a distributor of wire and cable products had an ongoing business relationship in which Houston purchased thermocouple products from PMC. The companies discussed an arrangement in which PMC would provide training and services to Houston to help it in sell products to end users. In exchange for PMC’s service and training, Houston would purchase its thermocouple products primarily from PMC. The companies finalized an agreement whereby Houston recognized PMC as its preferred supplier. The agreement further indicated that Houston would buy from other suppliers only if PMC could not supply the necessary product or if it could not match a competitor’s pricing. Subsequently, Houston’s orders began to decrease. Houston argued on appeal that the writings in question were unenforceable under the statute of frauds, for failure to list a quantity. Houston reasoned that although the letter stated that it expected to purchase a "major share" or "major portion" of its thermocouple products from PMC, these references to quantity were too indefinite to comply with the statute of frauds. The court disagreed and explained that so long as a quantity term was stated in the agreement, it did not need to be precisely stated. The court found the terms "major share" or "major portion" sufficient, to satisfy the statute of frauds was satisfied. Next, Houston asserted that because the parties did not enter into a valid requirements contract, the superior court’s jury instructions were improper. Further, Houston argued that even if the instruction on the requirements contracts was properly given, the instruction failed because it did not inform the jury that a valid requirements contract must have exclusivity between parties. In disagreement, the court reasoned that while a requirements contract does require exclusivity to determine quantity, the contract could be sufficiently exclusive if a purchaser agrees to purchase from only one seller, up to a certain amount. The court found that the superior court did not err in its jury instructions, because a jury could have determined that Houston agreed to purchase exclusively from PMC to a certain amount. The court determined that the jury instruction fairly presented the law to the jury and was not erroneous. Finally, Houston argued that the jury’s finding on the issue of contract formation was against the weight of evidence. The court found that the jury had ample evidence to find that the parties intended to form a binding contract.
DIVORCE – IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES – MARITAL ASSETS NADEAU, J. The plaintiff appealed certain findings and rulings recommended by the Marital Master (Pamela D. Kelly, Esq.) and approved by the Superior Court (Galway, J.) in his divorce decree. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The plaintiff (husband) and defendant (wife), who were married in 1986, sought a divorce on grounds of irreconcilable differences. They have one child together and the wife has two children from a prior marriage. First, the husband contends that the master erred in valuing his "ceased member" interest in his law firm. The husband noted that courts usually use a fair market value determination of property division in a divorce proceeding. The wife’s expert reasoned that no hypothetical willing buyer had to be considered because the husband’s firm is required to "buy" his ceased member interest. The court concluded that the trial court sustainably exercised its discretion in valuing the husband’s ceased member interest in an amount he could realize today. Second, the husband contended that the master erred by including in the division of his retirement accounts amounts attributable to contributions made prior to the marriage and after the libel for divorce. The court determined that the distribution of retirement accounts is governed by RSA 458:16-a and that the retirement accounts at issue were acquired prior to the date of the divorce, and found no error. Third, the husband argued that the master erred in excluding the wife’s interest in a family trust from the marital estate. The court declined to address this argument because: (1) the husband did not challenge an alternative portion of the master’s ruling, and (2) the husband requested findings of fact and rulings of law which sought to award the wife "her interest in the Trust from the marital estate, free and clear of any claim of [husband]." The husband next argued that the master erred in awarding solely to the wife a higher education fund given to her by her mother, while at the same time requiring him alone to pay for their son’s college education. Counter to the husband’s argument, the court found that the master declined to exclude the fund from the marital estate. The court further noted that the husband himself requested a ruling that the fund be awarded to the wife free and clear of any claim by him, and testified that he was willing to accept responsibility for his son’s higher education. Thus, the court found no error. Finally, the court vacated the child support order and remanded to the trial court for specific findings and explanations of the order, pursuant to RSA 458-C:5 (Supp. 2001). The court further concluded that specific findings as to the amount of child support that would be generated under the guidelines would facilitate the court’s review. Thus, the court instructed the trial court on remand to make a specific finding as to the amount of child support payable under the guidelines. See RSA 458-C:4, II.
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