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Bar News - November 16, 2012


NH Supreme Court At-a-Glance - October 2012

By:

Administrative Law

Appeal of Karen Hildreth (Personnel Appeals Board)
Personnel Appeals Board
Argued: September 20, 2012
Opinion Issued: October 30, 2012
Reverse and Remanded
  • Whether the petitioner forfeited her right to continue her appeal of a disciplinary action after she retired from State service.
The petitioner received two notices in her personnel file from the State for failure to meet a work standard and appealed these disciplinary actions using the settlement process. During the process she retired from State service and was told, as part of the process and later on appeal to the PAB, that because she was no longer an employee the settlement process was no longer available.

The Court evaluated whether the petitioner was a "permanent employee" when her appeal was filed with the PAB. They found that because the language of the statute does not include a "temporal qualifier" she is not inherently excluded. Additionally, the Court also finds that the remedy suggested by the State, placing a rebuttal letter in the petitioners personnel file, does not provide the relief that the statute meant to confer, a right to appeal personnel decisions to the PAB. Therefore, the court reverses and remands.

Kristin H. Sheppe (orally) and Michael C. Reynolds (on the brief), of Concord, for the petitioner. Michael A. Delaney, Attorney General (Rosemary Wiant, Assistant Attorney, on the brief and orally), for the State.


Appeal of Town of Moultonborough (New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board)
Public Employee Labor Relations Board
Argued: April 5, 2012
Opinion Issued: October 16, 2012
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded
  • Whether the Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) erred in granting a certification for a collective agreement filed by the New England Police Benevolent Association (NEPBA).
The NEPBA filed a petition to certify a proposed collective bargaining unit and the Town of Moultonborough objected. The PELRB certified the unit, the Town filed a motion which the PELRB denied and an appeal followed.

To determine if there is a bargaining unit for certification, the Court considered working conditions and PELRB regulations to find a community of interest. The Court found that the framework to establish a community of interest is flexible and that the PELRB doesnít have to satisfy all the criteria. The Town objected to the inclusion of various positions in the collective bargaining group, prompting the Court to do a position by position analysis. The Court held: (i) the PELRB addressed the part-time positions on their merits overruling the Townís objections for tardy inclusion of these positions; (ii) the executive assistant should be included in the collective bargaining group because they share a community of interest and do not act in a confidential capacity; and (iii) the sergeants and the corporal should not have been included because they have supervisory authority.

Nolan Perroni Harrington, of Lowell, Massachusetts (Kevin E. Buck on the brief and orally), for the petitioner. Rice Law Office, of Laconia (Anne M. Rice and J. Kristen Gardiner on the brief, and Ms. Rice orally), for the respondent.


Appeal of New Hampshire Department of Corrections (Public Employee Labor Relations Board)
Public Employee Labor Relations Board
Argued: September 13, 2012
Opinion Issued: October 30, 2012
Reversed and Remanded
  • Whether the PERLB erred in finding that the DOC had committed an unfair labor practice when they changed their practice of compensating employees for the time they spent completing a mandatory fitness test.
The Union filed an unfair labor practices complaint against the DOC alleging that the requirement to take a fitness test on their own time, without a work release or an award of compensatory time was a change in past practice and constituted a term and condition of employment. The PELRB agreed. The DOC appealed.

On review, the Court found that PELRB erred in finding that a past practice existed. DOC argues and the Court agrees that record doesnít support the PELRB findings of a past practice because (i) the Union did not supply any documents to support the claim that the practice of compensating employees for taking the fitness exam was a regular occurrence that employees expected to continue; and (2) the DOC wasnít on notice of the practice in order to be required to honor the practice.

Nolan Perroni Harrington, of Lowell, Massachusetts (Kevin E. Buck on the brief and orally) for the petitioner. Michael A. Delaney, Attorney General (LynMarie C. Cusack, Assistant Attorney General, on the brief and orally), for the respondent.


Constitutional Law

Petition of Southern New Hampshire Medical Center & a Original Jurisdiction
Argued: September 12, 2012
Opinion Issued: October 30, 2012
  • Whether several provisions of the statute governing medical screening panels violate the New Hampshire and United States Constitution.
Before litigation, the parties participated in a medical injury screening panel which decided in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff raised constitutional arguments to the court about certain statute provisions. The court granted the plaintiffís petition, the defendants made an interlocutory appeal and then filed an instant petition for original jurisdiction to the New Hampshire Supreme Court.

First, the plaintiff, relying primarily on an advisory opinion from the court, argued the statute violated the constitutionís separation of powers doctrine because RSA 519-B:8-10ís rules are akin to evidentiary rules and therefore fall within exclusive power of the judiciary. The Court declined to follow the advisory opinion. Supported by statements from the 1974 Constitutional Convention, the Court found that the judiciaryís authority to adopt evidentiary rules is concurrent with the legislatureís authority. For this reason, the Court found the requirement to admit panel findings to the jury and mandatory jury instructions do not violate the separation of powers doctrine.

Next, the plaintiff argues that RSA 519-B:8-10 violates their state constitutional right to a jury. The Court disagrees finding the plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial for her medical injury and that the panelís findings are evidence to be evaluated by the jury. The Court does find portions of RSA 519-B:8-9 unconstitutional because they "impermissibly infringes on the juryís fact finding role and consequently, deprive[s] a plaintiff of the state constitutional right to a jury trial" because the parties canít explain, challenge or contextual the report.

Nixon, Vogelman, Barry, Slawsky & Simoneau, of Manchester (David P. Slawsky on the brief and orally) and Christine M. Smith, of Manchester, by brief for the plaintiff. Sulloway & Hollis, of Concord (W. Kirk Abbott Jr &a on the brief, and Martin P. Honigberg orally), for the defendants. Douglas, Leonard & Garvey, of Concord (Benjamin t. King on the brief) and Center for Constitutional Litigation, of Washington, D.C. (Jeffrey R. White on the brief), for American Association of Justice and New Hampshire Association for Justice, as amici curiae. Rath, Young and Pingatelli, of Nashua (Michael A. Pingnatelli and Kenneth C. Bartholomew on the brief), for New Hampshire Medical Society, Maine Medical Association, Vermont Medical Society, New Hampshire Hospital Association, and American Medical Association, as amici curiae.


The State of New Hampshire v. Logan Schulz
Grafton
Argued: June 13, 2012, Resubmitted: August 17, 2012
Opinion Issued: October 4, 2012
Reversed and Remanded
  • Whether the trial court erred in not suppressing the evidence found in a search of the defendantís house.
In serving a notice against the defendant, the police observed guns on the premise and secured a search warrant. Even though it was determined early in the search that the guns were BB guns, the officers kept searching the house and found a locked box that the mother admitted contained cocaine and money. The officers secured a warrant and upon execution found cocaine and money in the box. The trial court denied the defendantís motion to suppress and convicted him of two drug charges.

The defendant argues that the evidence should have been suppressed under Part I, Article 19 of the State Constitution and under the 4th Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Court assumes without finding that the search warrant was supported by probable cause and satisfied the particularity requirement. However, the Court agrees with the defendant that the manner in which the warrant was executed "offended constitutional standards" because the police should have stopped searching after finding the BB guns.

The Court focuses on the Federal two step analysis for a search warrant, highlighting several cases where the warrant was reasonable when issued but became unreasonable in its execution. The Court highlights that it violates New Hampshireís Constitution to conduct a search under a defective warrant. Additionally, it would violate the Constitution if an officer continued searching if the facts that were the basis of the warrant were "dispelled." Probable cause must exist when the warrant is issued and executed. The gives officers some latitude in the search but an officer must discontinue a search under a warrant when there is a unambiguous and material change of the fact that eliminates probable cause. Here, the officer should have discontinued the search after finding the BB guns because the warrant did not have any other facts upon which to believe the search was justified. Therefore, suppression of the evidence was warranted and the Court reversed and remanded.

Michael A. Delaney, Attorney General (Elizabeth C. Woodcock, Assistant Attorney General, on the brief and orally), for the State. Stephanie Hausman, Assistant Appellate Defender, of Concord (on the brief and orally), for the defendant.


Criminal

The State of New Hampshire v. John Brooks
Rockingham
Argued: February 16, 2012
Opinion Issued: October 30, 2012
Affirmed
  • Whether the use of authenticated records violated the defendantís rights under the 6th Amendment Confrontation Clause and the New Hampshire Constitution.
  • Whether the trial court erred in allowing into evidence the FBI agentís testimony expressing an opinion about the defendantís family.
  • Whether the trial court erred in allowing the medical examiner to present a new opinion during trial.
  • Whether the trial court erred in rejecting the defendantís request for a jury instruction on "predominating cause."
  • Whether the trial court erred in its interpretation of RSA 630:1, I(b) and (c).
The case involves the appeal on various grounds of defendant convicted of capital murder and various other crimes. On appeal, the defendant argued that the use of authenticated records violated his rights under the New Hampshire Constitution and the 6th Amendment of the United States Constitution. The court evaluated whether the business records in this case were testimonial and found that telephone records, even those not given to a subscriber, are not testimonial because they were for the administration of the business. The court found that the certifications were used as a foundation for admission in the authentication procedure, their evidentiary value was minimal and therefore the defendantís confrontation rights were not violated.

The Court found consistent with Lopez that the trial court erred in allowing the FBI agentís testimony regarding a conversation with the family because it interfered with the "juryís obligation to determine witness credibility." However, the Court found the error in admitting the FBI agentís testimony was harmless and that the verdict wasnít affected by the admittance of the testimony given the alternative evidence presented and the character of the FBI agentís inadmissible evidence.

The defendant unsuccessfully argued on several grounds that the trial court erred in allowing the medical examiner to introduce a new opinion during testimony. The Court analyzed Rule 98 and pointed out that the trial court had probed the defense at trial. Then, the Court analyzed whether the medical examinerís opinion prejudiced the defenseís case finding no prejudice because the non-disclosure did not change the cause of death.

The defense also unsuccessfully argued that the trial court erred in rejecting the defenses request for a jury instruction related to "predominating cause." Upon reviewing the jury instructions provided, the Court determined that that the trial court did not need to provide instructions that the defendant struck a killing blow.

Finally, the court analyzed RSA 630-1,I(b) and (c). The Court agreed with the trial courtís interpretation of RSA 630-1(I)(c) and found that the statute only ascribed the phrase "pecuniary gain" to the person hired to kill. In regards to RSA 630-1(I)(b) the Court concurred with the majority of jurisdictions that the confinement of a person canít be incidental to the killing, i.e. "independent criminal responsibility" must be attributable. Here, the jury had to reach a unanimous decision regarding the confinement so the Court concluded there was no error with the instruction provided by the trial court.

Michael A. Delaney, Attorney General (Janice K. Rundles, Senior Assistant Attorney General, on the brief and orally), for the State. Hinckley, Allen & Snyder, of Concord (Christopher H.M. Carter and Danielle L. Pacik on the brief) and Foley Hoag, of Boston, Massachusetts (Martin F. Murphy on the brief and orally, for the defendant.


The State of New Hampshire v. Jonathan Charest
Strafford
Argued: September 12, 2012
Opinion Issued: October 16, 2012
Sentence vacated; remanded for resentencing
  • Whether the trial court erred in imposing a minimum mandatory sentence under RSA 651:2, II-g.
The defendant was convicted in a jury trial of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of RSA 159:3,I. The jury issued a special verdict finding that the defendant possessed a firearm and the trial court imposed a mandatory minimum sentence under RSA 651:2 II-g. The defendant appeals to the Court using the plain error rule.

The Court addressed whether the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant under RSA 651:2, II-g for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Under RSA 159:3, I there is no requirement to show that the firearm was a deadly weapon, only that he had in his possession the weapon detailed in the indictment. The State argued that a firearm and those in RSA 159:3 are deadly weapons per se and they donít need to make an additional showing under RSA 652:11, V. The Court disagreed saying that it is the circumstances surrounding the use of the item that render it deadly. Because the underlying crime did not have as an element the use of a deadly weapon the trial court erred in imposing a minimum mandatory sentence under RSA 651:2, II-g. Additionally, because the trial court believed they had no discretion and did not consider imposing a lesser sentence then the statutory minimum the Court found the sentence imposed affected the defendantís substantive rights. Finally, the trial court could have exercised its discretion and awarded a lower sentence and this error affected "the integrity and fairness of the judicial proceedings," therefore, the Court ordered the sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing.

Michael A. Delaney, Attorney General (Elizabeth C. Woodcock, Assistant Attorney General, on the brief and orally) for the State. Pamela E. Phelan, Assistant Appellate Defender, of Concord, on the brief and orally for the defendant.


State of New Hampshire v. Robert Baker
Newport District Court
Argued: June 7, 2012
Opinion Issued: October 30, 2012
Reverse in part, vacate in part and remand
  • Did the trial court err in denying the defendantís petition to annul his criminal convictions
The defendant petitioned the court to annul several criminal convictions, which the trial court denied. The trial court based this decision on the statute holding that granting an annulment was discretionary and in this case "inconsistent with the public welfare." The defendantís motions for reconsideration were denied and he appealed.

RSA 651:5 provides that except for a list of enumerated offenses granting an annulment is at the courtís discretion if "it will assist in the petitionerís rehabilitation and will be consistent with the public welfare. RSA 651:5, I. The Court held that two of the charges should have been annulled because the DOC found they were a mistake. Because the Court did not have sufficient information to make a determination of how the trial court would have acted if it had not considered the mistaken arrests, the Court vacated and remanded for further consideration by the trial court. The Court stated that the trial court canít simply deny a petition to annul solely based on the fact that a defendant was convicted; they must weigh "the factors in favor of annulment" against the public interest.

Michael A. Delaney, Attorney General (Nicholas Cort, Assistant Attorney General, on the memorandum of law and orally) for the State. Decato Law Office, of Lebanon (Brad W. Wilder on the brief and orally) for the defendant.


Criminal Procedure

State of New Hampshire v. Calvin Dunn, III
Belknap
Argued: June 14, 2012, Resubmitted July 20, 2012
Opinion Issued: October 16, 2012
Affirmed
  • Whether the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion in denying the defendants motion to vacate his suspended sentence.
The defendant, Calvin Dunn III, received a suspended sentence conditioned on his good behavior as part of a plea deal. Other charges were brought against the defendant during this time and the State filed a motion to impose the suspended sentence. The defendantís request to defer the hearing on the motion pending the outcome of the criminal trial was denied by the trial court. The court subsequently granted the Stateís motion and imposed the suspended sentence, which the defendant did not appeal. After the defendant was acquitted by the jury, he motioned to vacate the imposition of the suspended sentence, which, along with a motion for reconsideration, was denied by the trial court.

The defendant unsuccessfully appealed his motion to vacate the imposition of the suspended sentence on several grounds. Because the defendant failed to directly appeal the imposition of the suspended sentence within 30 day, the court (i) found that he waived the argument that there was insufficient evidence to support the courtís decision to impose the suspended sentence; and (ii) declined to hear the defendantís argument that the State v. Flood, 159 N.H. 353(2009) should be reversed and the hearing should have been postponed until his criminal trial concluded. Additionally, the Court concluded that the trial court did not "misinterpret the jury verdict" because the defendant did not point to a law that was misinterpreted and the trial court based the imposition of the suspended sentence on a independent assessment.

Michael A. Delaney, Attorney General (Nicholas Cort, Assistant Attorney General, on the brief and orally) for the State. M.D. Hulser & Associates, of Acworth (Michael D. Hulser on the brief and orally) for the Defendant.


Family Law

In Re Name Change of Alexander Goudreau
1st Circuit- Berlin Family Division
Argued September 13, 2012
Opinion Issued: October 30, 2012
Affirmed
  • Whether the court erred granting the petitioners request to change the name of the child.
Mother, the respondent, had a child out of wedlock and gave the child her last name. The petitioners filed a parenting petition and ex parte motion requesting parenting time with the child that the court granted. The petitioners later filed a petition to change the childís name to replace the motherís last name with the fatherís last name. The court granted the petition in part and ordered the childís name change to incorporate the motherís last name and the fatherís last name. The mother appealed.

The mother argued the best interest standard applied by the trial court is "vague, undefined, arbitrary and naked" and reflects "sexist social conventions." The court disagreed calling the standard elastic. They declined to enumerate factors when deciding on a name change and refused to adopt New Jerseyís presumption that the name given by the custodial parent is in the best interest of the child. The Court followed the majority of jurisdictions concluding that "no parent should benefit from a presumption in child-naming disputes." In this case, the Court sustained the trial courtís judgment.

The Crisp Law Firm, of Concord (Jack P. Crisp Jr. on the brief and orally), for the petitioners. Law Office of Joshua L. Gordon, of Concord (Joshua L. Gordon on the brief and orally) for the respondent.


In the Matter of Matthew Bordalo and Meagan Carter
6th Circuit- Concord Family Division
Argued: May 3, 2012
Opinion Issued: October 30, 2012
Reversed and Remanded
  • Whether the trial court erred in granting the father and his parents primary parenting responsibility of the daughter.
The mother and father had a protracted disagreement about their parenting agreement. The court had to intervene on several occasions, finding the mother in contempt and ordering specific changes in the parenting agreement. The fatherís parents intervened and the court granted, jointly with the father, primary parenting and residential responsibility.

The mother argues that the standard was not met when the court decided to award parental and residential responsibility to the father and his parents. Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in raising and caring for their children, regardless of whether they are an ideal parent. Where grandparents are requesting parenting responsibility itís not the best interest standard that the court must use, but rather the Broderick Test laid out in Troxel. Here, while the parties contended the issue was between parents and the best interest standard should apply, the trial court utilized the Broderick test in making its award to the father and his parents. The Court looked only at two prongs of the Broderick Test to determine that the standard had not been met when the trial court awarded parental and residential responsibility to the fatherís parents. Here, there was not clear and convincing evidence that the fatherís parents had a parenting role with the daughter. Living at a grandparentís home during visitation does not establish a parenting relationship. Therefore, the child would not suffer emotional harm and there was no need for the state to enforce its interest. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Clark Law Offices, of Manchester (Deborah M. Shepard on the brief), for the petitioner. Orr& Reno, of Concord (Jeremy D. Eggleton on the brief and orally) for the respondent. Devine, Millimet &Branch, of Manchester (Pamela A. Peterson & a. on the brief and Ms. Peterson orally) for the intervenors.


In the Matter of Nancy E. Woolsey and Grant E. Woolsey
Plymouth Family Division
Argued: June 7, 2012
Opinion Issued: October 30, 2012
Reversed and Remanded
  • Whether the trial court erred in modifying a child support obligation, where the respondent was self- employed.
The respondent is a self-employed truck driver who moved to modify his child support order alleging a substantial change in circumstance. Basing his income from his self-employment taxes, the trial court found the respondentís circumstances were not changed and the respondentís claims of financial hardship not credible.

First, the Court addressed whether the trial court erred in using the respondentís business gross income to calculate his child support obligation. The Court reviewed RSA 458-C;2, IV to define gross income, to include "business profits" and "self-employment income." The court defines "business profits" as the deduction of expenses from gross business income and "self employment income" as "gross receipts less business expenses." Business expenses must be legitimate and for earning income.

The Court evaluated what constituted a "legitimate business expense." The Court held (i) they are the costs incurred in earning the gross income; (ii) "reasonable and necessary for the production of income"; and (iii) for the purposes of "self-employment income under RSA 458-C-2, IV the expenses must actually be incurred and paid. The Court held that the trial court judge must determine if the expenses claimed by are legitimate. The Court remanded to determine if the expenses are legitimate.

Martin, Lord & Osman, of Laconia (Judith L. Homan on the brief and orally), for the petitioner. Seufert, Davis & Hunt, of Franklin (Lexie Rojas on the brief and orally) for the respondent.


Municipal Law

Town of Barrington v. Richard Townsend
Strafford
Argued March 8, 2012
Opinion Issued: October 16, 2012
Affirmed
  • Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Town of Barrington on the claim that the respondent used his property as a campground and his barn as a dwelling without proper town approvals.
  • Whether the trial court erred in awarding attorneyís fees to the Town of Barrington.
The respondent owns property in the Town of Barrington with a "furnished barn" and metered electrical/water/ sewer hooks-ups. After a fire destroyed his home, the respondent began living in his barn and the town sent him a cease and desist order informing him that this, in addition to renting his hook ups, was a violation of the townís zoning laws. The Town brought suit against the respondent in order for injunctions, civil penalties and attorneyís fees and the respondent brought a number of counterclaims. On appeal, the respondent argued that the trial erred in granting the motion for summary judgment on the code violations.

The respondent argued and the Court agreed that the trial court should have considered whether the distinction between commercial and non-commercial use of the property was material to the determination that the use was non-residential. The Court considers the issue of "non-residential" using the rules of statutory construction finding that the trial court was correct in using "non-residential" to describe the respondentís property. The Court agrees with the Townís arguments that an injunction was necessary because, based on the facts in evidence and the zoning ordinance of the barnís use without a certificate of occupancy, there was a danger the violation would recur. On appeal, the court also considers the award of attorney fees, which the Court feels are reasonable because the trial court found the overall fee reasonable and their involvement with the case allowed them to assess the accuracy of the estimate provided by the attorney.

Mitchell Municipal Group, of Laconia (Judith E. Whitelaw on the brief and orally), for the petitioner. Douglas, Leonard & Garvey, of Concord (Charles G. Douglas, III on the brief and orally), for the respondent.


Property - Eminent Domain

J.K.S. Realty, LLC v. Nashua
Hillsborough-Southern Judicial District
Argued: April 5, 2012
Opinion Issued: October 10, 2012
Affirmed
  • The Court addressed the City of Nashuaís motion to dismiss the appeal based on the doctrine of election of remedies because the petitioner was seeking damages in this case but had received a deposit from the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA).
  • Whether the Trial Court erred in finding that the City of Nashua did not take the petitioners property by inverse condemnation.
The petitioners owned a parcel of land in Nashua located near the proposed Broad Street Parkway (BSP). The petitioners purchased the land in 1980, had it rezoned for multi-family development in 1985, and made investments in the land to prepare the property for sale. Starting in 1998, the petitioners attempted to sell the property, but took it off the market in 2004 after several failed attempts to sell. In 2009, the petitioners filed a petition for inverse condemnation claiming the uncertainty regarding whether the property would be taken in whole or in part as part of the BSP.

The City of Nashua argued the petitioner could recover twice in this proceeding and also with the BTLA and made a motion to dismiss the appeal based on the doctrine of election of remedies. The Court found that the doctrine of election of remedies did not apply because the petitioner was not being "unjustly enrichedÖ [nor the defendant] mislead by the [petitioners] conduct," the result wasnít inequitable nor did res judicata apply.

Next, the Court looked to other jurisdictions to determine whether the BSPís prolonged planning and delayed condemnation proceedings constituted an inverse condemnation. The Court in upholding the trial courtís decision cited a specific case and stated the Townís interference with the "marketability" of the property alone wasnít sufficient, that the circumstances, which are not found here, must be "egregious," such as the City rezoning the area to prevent development.

The petitioner asserts several claims that the trial court "committed reversible error." The main claim the Court focuses on involves a policy argument regarding "equity, fairness and justice" and whether the public rather than the petitioner should have to bear the burden for the BSPís delays. The Court held that the trial court did not err in declining to rule that the burden must be borne by the City. The Court found the "governmental interference must be sufficiently direct, sufficiently peculiar, and of sufficient magnitude." Sundell, 119 N.H. 839, 845 (1997) Planning, announcements, governmental approvals, surveys, legislation are not sufficient because the land could be left undisturbed.

Green Lombardi Law Group, of Bedford (Arthur G. Greene on the brief and orally) and Prunier & Prolma, of Nashua (Gerald R. Prunier on the brief), for the petitioners. Office of Corporation Counsel, of Nashua (James M. McNamee on the brief and Stephen M. Bennett orally), for the respondent.


Stacie Ayn M. Corcoran

Stacie Ayn Murphy Corcoran received a B.A. from the University of Tennessee in Spanish and Hispanic Studies, a M.B.A from Plymouth State University and a J.D. with a concentration in Intellectual Property Law from Suffolk University Law School. She is a solo practitioner with Murphy Corcoran P.L.L.C., a business oriented law firm. She focuses her practice on business and intellectual property counseling and transactions for small businesses, technology and manufacturing companies, and resellers in NH and Massachusetts.

Supreme Court Rule 42(9) requires all NH admitted attorneys to notify the Bar Association of any address change, home or office.

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